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R321item almost two and a half times as
often as the other individual.
These results provide strong
evidence that frequency-modulated
bouts repel rivals and thereby
enhance prey capture, but they do not
explain why these calls exert such an
effect. Although this question will be
the subject of many exciting studies in
the future, the current study does
provide valuable insight. By analyzing
the acoustic structure of frequency-
modulated bouts, the authors show
that these vocalizations are
individually distinctive, and that
individual bats could, in theory, be
identified reliably solely on the basis of
their acoustic characteristics. If other
bats use these cues to recognize
callers, as has been shown in a wide
range of other animal species [16],
then they could adjust their behaviour
according to their previous
interactions with calling individuals.
For example, recognizing a previously
aggressive male could allow an
individual to abandon its pursuit of a
contested food item, and thus avoid
any physical aggression that might
otherwise ensue. Two lines of
evidence support such a function.
First, although male big brown bats
often live alone, they do occasionally
live with females or other males [17],
making repeated interactions among
known foragers possible. Second,
some wild big brown bats patrol
foraging grounds and use physical
aggression to chase away competitors
[18]. Taken together, this suggests
that early recognition of aggressive
individuals could be an adaptive trait
that reduces the risk of injury to
perceptive individuals.
The Wright et al. study [6] reveals
a new level of complexity and
functionality in what is already one of
the most sophisticated vocal
systems described. Yet the study also
raises a host of interesting new
questions. For example, what
information do frequency-modulated
bouts communicate? When two
individuals meet, what determines
which individual will call? Why do
males call, but females do not? And,
finally, how does the nervous system
coordinate the multiple activities
involved in foraging, thereby allowing
bats to echolocate, fly, monitor
competitors, emit social calls, and
respond to social calls with
split-second adjustments to foraging
behaviour [19].More generally, the study
contributes to our understanding of
how vocalizations mediate social
interactions among foraging animals.
Food-associated calls are produced
by a wide range of species, but
most appear to be cooperative, in
that they increase the probability
that the recipient approaches and
consumes the food [20]. In contrast,
the frequency-modulated bouts
described here function to repel
call recipients from food, suggesting
that these signals have been
shaped by very different selective
forces.
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Dopamine’s Role in Reinforcement
LearningOver the last two decades, dopamine and reinforcement learning have been
increasingly linked. Using a novel, axiomatic approach, a recent study shows
that dopamine meets the necessary and sufficient conditions required by the
theory to encode a reward prediction error.Eric E.J. DeWitt
Nearly two decades ago, researchers
noticed that the activity of
dopaminergic neurons bore a strikingresemblance to the reward prediction
error signal predicted by reinforcement
learning [1,2]. The notion of
reinforcement learning was developed
to unify and formalize decades of work
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Figure 1. Dopamine and the reward prediction error.
Red bars show schematized reward prediction errors from temporal difference reinforcement
learning in uncued and cued reward conditions. In blue are approximations of observed dopa-
mine responses in arbitrary units. Changes in dopamine concentration (dashed) appear to
differ from firing rates (solid) for negative reward prediction errors.
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R322in learning theory from different
disciplines, combining physiological
and psychological trial-and-error
learning theories with observations
from classical and operant
conditioning research and the
theoretical machinery of dynamic
programming and optimal control [3].
While this theory has been successful
in predicting behavior and neural
activity in a variety of conditions,
alternative theories for dopamine’s role
in learning and behavior are consistent
with available evidence. Further,
observations continue to be made that
are inconsistent with dopamine
encoding a reward prediction
error — at least on the surface [4–7].
In a recent study, Hart et al. [8] bring
together a novel axiomatic approach
derived from neuroeconomics with
direct measurements of dopamine
release to demonstrate that changes in
dopamine concentration encode the
information necessary to support any
reinforcement learning theory that uses
a reward prediction error. This work
greatly strengthens the argument that
phasic dopamine release could play a
central role in the implementation of
reinforcement learning in the
mammalian brain.
Why Reinforcement Learning?
Reinforcement learning is
fundamentally an approach to thefollowing problem: how do you learn
from the outcomes of your actions,
assuming you want to maximize your
(long-term) expected reward, without
any explicit correction? Early work on
this question included Thorndike’s
learning experiments, where an animal
was placed in a box and had to try a
series of behaviors until it stumbled on
the one that aided its escape. Engineers
andcomputer scientists have asked the
same question from a very different
perspective: if you want to control a
complex system, such as a power
plant, how can you determine the best
possible control policy— where a
policy is simply the actions you should
take in a given situation. Reinforcement
learning was proposed as an
unsupervised solution, where instead
of learning the (perhaps unknown)
correct answer, you learn the expected
value of the available actions in each
situation. The core insight is that you
can learn which actions are best using
only the ‘reinforcement’— reward or
punishment — you receive, even when
the reinforcement is delayed. In fact,
reinforcement learning provides a
normative framework that offers proof
that you can learn to make the optimal
choice under some conditions.
Reinforcement learning is of
particular interest to neuroscientists
and psychologists because of temporal
difference learning, which uses thedifference between the value you
expect and what you receive when you
take an action — the reward prediction
error — to learn what actions or
situations are best. Importantly, in a
situation where an action will lead to
future reinforcement, the value
associated with the action predicts
future reinforcement — a feature that
can explain many, but not all, aspects
of classical and operant conditioning.
Figure 1 shows the hypothetical reward
prediction error used by temporal
difference learning in red for
unexpected reward and cued
conditioning.
Dopamine’s Important Role
Arvid Carlsson’s early work
demonstrated that dopamine is a
neurotransmitter and that its depletion
leads to a catatonic state similar to
Parkinson’s disease — work for which
he was later awarded the Nobel prize.
While dopamine was later linked to
learning and motivation, it wasn’t until
Wolfram Schultz and his colleagues
[1,2,9] began to investigate the activity
of dopamine neurons during awake
behavior to understand its role in action
initiation and Parkinson’s that the
connection to reinforcement learning
was made. In these experiments,
dopamine activity was observed to
respond to unexpected rewards and to
cues that predicted rewards, a hallmark
of the reward prediction error (Figure 1,
blue).
Subsequently, in classical
conditioning experiments in humans
and animals, dopamine related signals
were shown to initially respond to the
unexpected reward but, over time, to
respond to predictive cues instead
[2,9,10]. Recently, artificially increasing
dopamine neuron activity at the time
of a reward was shown to increase
actions towards a cue, evenwhen there
should have been no endogenous
reward prediction error [11]. Together,
these features demonstrate a
compelling correlation with the
theoretical reward prediction error of
temporal difference reinforcement
learning, and suggestive causal
evidence that dopamine affects the
expected value of an action.
But this evidence is also compatible
with other theories of reward-based
motivation, salience and reinforcement
learning [6]. Further, evidence is
also accumulating for apparent
contradictions between dopamine
firing rates and the theoretical reward
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Figure 2. Testing the dopamine reward prediction error axioms.
Schematized axiomatic tests. Response to a higher valued outcome (in red) and a lower
valued outcome (in blue). The horizontal axis represents possible lotteries (the probabilities
for a weighted coin) ranging from probability one (solid red) to probability zero (solid blue)
of the red outcome.
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R323prediction errors [4,5,7,12,13]. If an
expected reward isn’t received,
dopamine neurons ‘pause’ — a
puzzling feature not obviously
compatible with encoding a reward
prediction error that we will return to
later [13]. Some dopamine neurons
appear to respond to aversive events
as though theywere rewarding or to the
‘informative’ value of a cue rather than
it’s predicted reinforcement [4,5,7].
Overall, while reinforcement learning
and the dopamine reward prediction
error hypothesis have garnered much
deserved attention, questions remain,
including which of the many variants of
temporal difference or other forms of
reinforcement learning might be
involved [14].
Neuroeconomics and the Axiomatic
Approach
In the last few years, the emerging
field of neuroeconomics has sought to
bring new tools and approaches to
neuroscience. The neuroeconomists’
goal is to bring together
microeconomic theory and economic
methods with decision psychology
and systems neuroscience [15,16].
Traditionally, economists infer an
individual’s preferences by observing
their choices. Microeconomic theory
tells us that, under some assumptions,
we can describe these preferences
using a utility function— a function that
assigns a value to each possible
choice, such that an action that has a
higher utility is chosen over one that
has a lower utility. Importantly, the
mapping between choices,
preferences and the utility function is
quite general. The theory tells us that
some utility function exists that will
describe the individuals’ preferences
but allows the actual ‘subjective’
utilities experienced to remain
incompletely specified. In other
words, we could not take particular
measurements of absolute values —
for example, in a brain area — as
evidence for or against the utility
representation.
If you violate the assumptions of the
utility representation, however, you can
reject the hypothesis that any utility
function from the class could describe
the individual’s preferences.
Economists formalize their
assumptions using axioms, and the
axioms of revealed preferences
describe the assumptions needed for a
utility function to predict choice.
Reinforcement learning naturallyresonated with neuroeconomics
because both the predictions of the
theory— choices— and the theoretical
tools employed — for example,
dynamic programming or value
functions — are common to both. But
the neuroeconomic approach
precludes the evidence reviewed
above as directly supporting or
discounting the hypothesis that
dopamine carries a reward prediction
error, because it would require
specifying particular subjective
utilities.
Taking an axiomatic approach,
Caplin and Dean [17,18] wrote down
the necessary and sufficient conditions
for an axiomatic representation of the
dopamine reward prediction error
hypothesis. The axioms are over
lotteries and outcomes — where a
lottery specifies the probability of each
outcome and, in this case, can be
thought of as a weighted coin. The data
that passes or violates the axioms can
be schematized as shown in Figure 2,
where the two outcomes (red or blue)
are plotted with arbitrary ‘dopamine’
reward prediction error responses. The
lines represent response when there is
some surprise (non-zero probabilities)
and the filled circles are the response
when the outcome is perfectly
predicted. The horizontal axis
represents the weighting of the coin
(red is higher probability of the red
outcome).
The axioms formulated by Caplin and
Dean [17,18] are as follows. The ‘more
is better’ axiom: if one outcome
produces a higher response than
another for some lottery, it should
cause a higher relative response for any
other lottery. The ‘surprise coherence’
axiom: roughly, with increasingprobability of receiving an outcome
across lotteries, if you are less
surprised when you receive that
outcome and produce a lower
response it must be the same for the
other outcome with the same lotteries.
The ‘no surprise equivalence’ axiom:
you should produce the same response
for any outcome, if you receive the
outcome when you expect it perfectly.
The first test of these axioms came
using a proxy for dopamine release, the
blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD)
response of functional magnetic
resonance imaging [19,20]. While this
provided support for the prior work
arguing that BOLD responses reflected
a dopamine reward prediction error
[10,14], it is a proxy signal which might
not directly reflect dopamine changes
at the synapse, where presumably it
would be acting. The new work by Hart
et al. [8] extends the initial axiomatic
work on the dopamine reward
prediction error hypothesis and,
additionally, addresses another long
standing puzzle [4].
Hart et al. [8] used fast-scan cyclic
voltammetry tomeasure the changes in
concentration of dopamine in the
nucleus accumbens on a fast
time-scale, and then applied the
axiomatic tests directly to the
dopamine efflux. In their experiment,
rats chose between two levers that
returned either one or four pellets of rat
chow, sometimes deterministically
(one lever provided four pellets with
certainty and the other with one pellet)
and sometimes probabilistically (each
lever was a lottery over the two
outcomes). In the probabilistic
condition, the rats faced two ‘weighted
coins’ where the probability of
receiving one or four pellets was
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and vice-versa on the other, with the
‘good’ lever switching between
sessions. The animals made a mixture
of free and forced choices, allowing the
experimenters to assess if the animals
had learned the value of the leverswhile
ensuring dopamine recordings in all
conditions.
By measuring the dopamine release
in the deterministic case they were able
to test the ‘no surprise equivalence’
axiom, showing that the dopamine
release is the same when the animal
receives one pellet or four pellets with
certainty. Using the probabilistic
sessions where the animals experience
a reward prediction error on every trial,
they are able to test the remaining two
axioms. The ‘more is better’ axiom was
satisfied, because four pellets caused a
larger dopamine release than one pellet
for both probability conditions. The
‘surprise coherence’ axiom was
satisfied, because the 25% probability
evokedmore relative dopamine release
than the 75% for each of the two
outcomes. While practical limitations
prevent the exhaustive testing of every
possible outcome and probability
combination, these results provide a
different kind of support for the
dopamine reward prediction error
hypothesis than has been shown
before: they provide evidence that the
necessary and sufficient conditions
can be met for dopamine release to
encode a reward prediction error. It is a
legitimate question whether we should
consider the axioms satisfied, given
that they only tested two probability
conditions, but the same practical
limitations precluding exhaustive
testing here are true for all other
approaches (for example, model
comparison). The benefit of this
approach is that if we really believed an
axiom is falsified, it would call for a
much deeper reconsideration of the
theory being tested than merely failing
a statistical test.
Hart et al. [8] then addressed the
apparent contradiction caused by
the non-linear response to reward
prediction errors observed in
dopamine neuron firing rates. Because
dopamine neurons have low baseline
firing rates it has long been thought
difficult or impossible for dopamine to
encode both the positive and negative
differences from expectation
necessary for a reward prediction error
[1,2,9,13] (Figure 1, solid line),
presumably requiring a second systemto carry negative reward prediction
errors. Interestingly, the relationship
between reward prediction error and
dopamine release was completely
linear over the range measured,
suggesting that the kinetics of
dopamine release, dopamine
re-uptake and other mechanisms
removed the non-linearity observed
between the neural firing rate and
reward prediction error (Figure 1,
dashed line).
Not every neuroscience theorywill be
amenable to axiomatization and, while
this work does not preclude different
dopamine release properties in other
areas or resolve questions about
what kind of temporal difference
reinforcement learning may be
employed, it should encourage future
interactions between the reinforcement
learning, neuroeconomics and
neuroscience communities.References
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provided the first visualization of septin filament formation in real time, leading
to important new insights into their organization.Theodore Pham, Jessica E. DiCiccio,
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The septins comprise a family of
cytoskeletal GTPases that wereoriginally identified as being essential
for proper cell division in budding yeast
[1]. Septins form distinct, dynamic
structures that line, and subsequently
flank the bud neck betweenmother and
